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1. INTRODUCTION 
Given its limited processing capacity, the brain needs to detect, encode and 
make use of the most important information in a prioritized manner. To this 
end, various attention mechanisms amplify some representations of internal and 
external reality at the expense of others (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 
2011). Vast amounts of sensed and retained information can thereby be kept at 
arms lengths while focussing on only the most useful bits of it. Often, this focus 
is captured by emotional information – a phenomenon known as affective, 
emotional or motivated attention (for reviews see Bradley, 2009; Compton, 
2003; Mitchell & Greening, 2012; Pessoa, 2005, 2008; Pourtois, Schettino, & 
Vuilleumier, 2013; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009; 
Vuilleumier, 2005; Yiend, 2010). Affective attention complements our abilities 
to concentrate at will (i.e. top-down attention) and remain vigilant for unpre-
dicted aspects of the environment (i.e. bottom-up attention) with heightened 
sensitivity to threats and rewards. 
Behaviourally, affective attention manifests itself in enhanced processing of 
inherently emotional or previously rewarded stimuli (Anderson, 2013; Yiend, 
2010). Affective information seems to draw the spotlight of attention, ex-
plaining why an angry face “pops out” of a crowd (Frischen, Eastwood, & 
Smilek, 2008) or a sequence (e.g. Kreegipuu et al., 2013) of neutral ones. It 
similarly appears to retain attention to the extent that targets following an 
emotional distractor in a rapid stimulus stream are missed (i.e. the emotional 
attentional blink phenomenon; McHugo, Olatunji, & Zald, 2013). Affective 
content also tends to interfere with performing complex tasks such as naming 
the ink colour of a word instead of its meaning (Phaf & Kan, 2007). In short, 
behavioural responses reveal that emotional stimuli are processed in a prio-
ritized manner.  
It is currently unclear how this prioritisation emerges from the interplay 
between generic cognitive and specifically affective attention mechanisms. The 
work presented here sheds some light on this question by using electro-
encephalography (EEG) to dissociate two pairs of constituent processes of 
affective attention. More specifically, Studies I to IV employ and extend as-
sociations between EEG dynamics and temporal stages of affective attention 
deployment. Studies II and III meanwhile suggest that posterior EEG power in 
theta and alpha frequency bands can capture, respectively, excitatory and 
inhibitory contributions to the relative amplification of emotional represen-
tations. Finally, these neural correlates of affective attention are demonstrated to 
be useful for understanding other emotional phenomena such as emotion 
regulation (Study II), affective time distortions (Study IV), and anterior EEG 
asymmetry (Study V). 
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1.1. Brain mechanisms of attention 
The unitary experience of attending to something is produced by a number of 
brain mechanisms (Knudsen, 2007). In this section, I will sketch a simplified 
quasi-anatomical information processing model of these mechanisms (see 
Figure 1) based on recent reviews of cognitive (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Beck & 
Kastner, 2009; Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2013; Theeuwes, 2010) as well as 
affective visual attention research (Mitchell & Greening, 2012; Pessoa & 
Adolphs, 2010; Pourtois et al., 2013; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; Vuilleumier 
& Huang, 2009). The model does not attempt to explain all existing findings nor 
map the depicted mechanisms to actual brain regions (for a more ambitious 
effort in both respects see Baluch & Itti, 2011). It is also restricted to attention 
operating over external information captured by the visual modality. The model 
is intended to function as a basis for integrating the findings of this thesis as 
well as extrapolating them into two sets of extended hypotheses specifying (a) 
the emergence of two stages of attention as well as (b) manifestations of diffe-
rent bias signals in distinct parameters of posterior EEG dynamics. 
The model assumes that selection from a multitude of available stimuli is 
achieved by (a) biasing naturally occurring competition between neural repre-
sentations (solid arrows on Figure 1; Beck & Kastner, 2009; Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). The ultimate origins of such biases are signals arriving from (b) 
a saliency map reflecting stimulus infrequency in space or time (Theeuwes, 
2010; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004) and (c) a relevance map representing stimulus 
importance for the goals maintained in working memory (Baluch & Itti, 2011; 
Noudoost, Chang, Steinmetz, & Moore, 2010). These bottom-up and top-down 
selection filters both contribute to (d) an integrated priority map which sends 
unified bias signals to sensory brain regions (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; Fecteau 
& Munoz, 2006; Gottlieb & Balan, 2010; Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2013). 
Emotional attention involves much of the same machinery complemented by (e) 
an affective significance map associated with a dedicated subcortical network 
centred on amygdala (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pourtois et al., 2013). 
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Figure 1. A simplified model of cognitive and affective attention mechanisms. Filled 
rightward arrows represent bottom-up flow of visual information; solid leftward arrows 
are the bias signals modulating recurrent sweeps in visual brain areas. Dashed arrows 
represent precursors to the bias signals that are integrated in the priority map. Pointed 
arrows are additional connections with working memory. Numbers denote the early and 
late stages of affective attention at which the given signals first reach their destinations. 
Colours represent types of selection: red – affective significance; blue – top-down goal-
relevance; grey – bottom-up salience; green – integrated priority. 
 
 
Selective amplification of sensory representations 
According to the biased competition theory (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), 
selection is achieved in the brain by interfering with the natural state of com-
petition between stimulus representations (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Beck & Kastner, 
2009; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Gilbert & Sigman, 2007; Knudsen, 2007; 
Noudoost et al., 2010). Without attention, simultaneously visible stimuli have 
been demonstrated to inhibit each other’s neural manifestations on the level of 
single cell firing rates (e.g. Reynolds, Chelazzi, & Desimone, 1999) as well as 
regional brain activity (e.g. Kastner et al., 2001). Attending to one of the 
competing stimuli however, amplifies its representation relative to others, 
almost restoring the response it elicited when presented alone (Munneke, 
Heslenfeld, & Theeuwes, 2008; Reynolds et al., 1999). Attention can thus be 
said to bias the neural competition in favour of the selected stimuli. Similar 
attention-induced amplifications have been observed for retinotopic locations of 
upcoming targets (i.e. anticipatory attention; e.g. Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, 
Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999; Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 1997) 
as well as neurons encoding attended stimulus attributes such as colour (i.e. 
feature-based attention; e.g. Bichot, Rossi, & Desimone, 2005). On a more 
detailed level, attentional biasing can take various forms such as enhanced or 
more consistent firing rates, increased neural synchrony, or altered receptive 
field properties; all of which serve to strengthen some neural representations 
relative to others (Beck & Kastner, 2009; Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2013; 
Womelsdorf & Fries, 2007). 
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Saliency map – bottom-up infrequency detection 
As can be seen on Figure 1, sensory representations can be biased by several 
mechanisms. The most apparent distinction among these sources of attention 
involves bottom-up (also exogenous, automatic) and top-down (also endoge-
nous, controlled) selection, represented on Figure 1 by the saliency and 
relevance maps, respectively. Exogenous attention results in a largely involun-
tary prioritization of stimuli that are infrequent in space (e.g. salient) or time 
(e.g. novel; Knudsen, 2007). For instance, it is hard not to notice an abrupt onset 
of motion such as a bird taking off from a stationary flock. Saliency is a 
function of spatial discontinuity along simple dimensions such as colour, 
orientation, size, or motion (Theeuwes, 2010; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). Mean-
while, the attentional pull of novelty can be observed in response to stimulus 
changes (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004) and rare events (Näätänen, 1990). As a 
system dedicated to infrequency, bottom-up attention assures prompt processing 
of unpredicted aspects of the environment with higher-than-average infor-
mational value (Gottlieb & Balan, 2010). Neural computations of saliency occur 
first of all within the visual brain areas themselves. For instance, even low-level 
mechanisms such as lateral inhibition and temporal adaptation serve to amplify 
infrequency in space and time, respectively (Knudsen, 2007). Meanwhile, more 
complex integration of local infrequency into a global saliency map seems to 
require activity in subcortical regions such as the superior colliculus (SC) and 
the substantia nigra as well as a dorsal frontoparietal cortical network com-
prising of regions such as the frontal eye fields (FEF) and the lateral 
intraparietal area (LIP; Baluch & Itti, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Katsuki 
& Constantinidis, 2013). Finally, a “circuit-breaking” function of exogenous 
attention, whereby on-going endogenous concentration is intercepted, has been 
associated with a ventral frontoparietal network encompassing the temporo-
parietal junction as well as the ventral prefrontal cortex (PFC; Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Shomstein, 2012). 
 
Relevance map – top-down goal-congruence 
Complementing the vigilance provided by bottom-up attention, top-down selec-
tion mechanisms assure that goal-relevant information is prioritized irrespective 
of its saliency. For instance, drivers can concentrate on a changing traffic light 
while ignoring equally salient events such as someone opening a colourful 
umbrella on the sidewalk. Endogenous attention can be conceptualised as a rele-
vance map maintained in working memory (WM) where each spatial location 
and/or perceptual feature receives a value based on its significance for current 
goals. For instance, an arrow cue in a typical attention task increases the rele-
vance of one visual hemifield over the other, based on task structure (“cues 
generally predict stimulus locations”) and active goals (“I need to respond to 
stimulus onsets”; collectively also called an attention set) represented in 
working memory (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Soto, 
Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008). In addition to maintaining the atten-
tion set, working memory constantly updates the representations of internal 
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states and external reality with the help of different attention mechanisms 
(Knudsen, 2007). Conceptually, attention and working memory therefore 
overlap to some extent – a view also supported by their shared capacity limita-
tions, frontoparietal substrate and reliance on biasing of sensory representations 
(Chun, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012; Knudsen, 
2007; Postle, 2006). In the brain, working memory involvement implicates the 
PFC as the distal source of top-down biasing (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Knudsen, 
2007). From the PFC onwards however, the relevance signals seem to be 
relayed via the same dorsal frontoparietal network implicated in salience map-
ping (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Katsuki & Constan-
tinidis, 2013; Noudoost et al., 2010).  
 
Priority map – integrated salience and relevance 
The dichotomy between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms captures the dual 
purpose of attention – to filter out goal-irrelevant information while retaining 
vigilance for significant bits of it. Think of concentrating to what your friend is 
saying in a crowded café until someone you know is mentioned at the neigh-
bouring table. In many ways however, the distinction between endogenous and 
exogenous attention is far from clear-cut (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Katsuki & 
Constantinidis, 2013; Rauschenberger, 2010). On one hand, as expressed in 
models such as the contingent capture theory (Folk, Remington, & Wright, 
1994), bottom-up stimulus selection is constrained by top-down attention 
control settings (Egeth, Leonard, & Leber, 2010; de Fockert, 2010; Nordfang & 
Bundesen, 2010). For instance, the pop-out effect characteristic of bottom-up 
attention is facilitated when salient stimuli are also task-relevant (Anderson, 
2013; Eimer & Kiss, 2008; Wolfe, 1994). On the other hand, exogenously 
captured information can swiftly enter working memory, be judged as goal-
relevant and thereby become targeted by endogenous attention as well (Knud-
sen, 2007). In short, a realistic sketch of attention mechanisms should consider 
exogenous and endogenous selection as integrated and recurrent processes 
(Rauschenberger, 2010). 
One way to account for the simultaneous inter- and independence of 
ascending and descending attention is to imagine an intermediate priority map 
that pools exogenous saliency and endogenous relevance into a unitary repre-
sentation of what is important which is then used to guide sensory amplification 
(Baluch & Itti, 2011; Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; 
Serences & Yantis, 2007; Wolfe, 1994). On the neural level, this fourth 
mechanism of attention may be the best conceptualisation for the role of the 
brain regions that have been implicated in both bottom-up and top-down tasks 
(Baluch & Itti, 2011; Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Knudsen, 2007). In particular, 
the priority map has been associated with the LIP (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010), 
the FEF (Thompson & Bichot, 2005) and/or the SC (Baluch & Itti, 2011). In 
top-down selection the FEF possibly drives the LIP while in bottom-up tasks 
information initially flows in the opposite direction (Katsuki & Constantinidis, 
2013). Notably, these brain regions are also involved in generating eye-move-
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ments. For instance, while weak stimulation of the FEF moves the focus of 
attention, stronger input also initiates a saccade to the attended location (Moore 
& Fallah, 2004). This observation converges with a premotor theory which 
considers attention to be a covert predecessor of overt eye-movements. Ac-
cording to this view, both mechanisms enhance the quality of neural represen-
tations with the respective help of foveal vision and sensory biasing (Nobre, 
Gitelman, Dias, & Mesulam, 2000; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 
1987). 
A simplified model of the brain mechanisms of cognitive attention has thus 
emerged (see Figure 1, ignoring the affective significance map for now). The 
end result of all selection mechanisms is modulated activity in sensory brain 
regions. The bias signals inducing these modulations originate from a priority 
map which in turn integrates the saliency of stimuli detected in bottom-up 
manner with their relevance assessed in working-memory. Given the involve-
ment of visual brain areas in computing the former, the saliency map on Figure 
1 also has a direct input to sensory representations while its’ circuit-breaking 
function is depicted as a connection with WM. Finally, top-down attention 
involves a relevance map that weighs visual input in light of current goals and 
communicates the results to the priority as well as saliency maps. Taken 
together, the four components introduced up to now represent the machinery 
involved in visual cognitive attention. The next section explains how the same 
components interact with an affect-specific network in emotional attention. 
 
Affective significance map 
Affective attention is usually differentiated from the rest of selection pheno-
mena by its target – information with some emotional significance, stemming 
from evolutionary past, reinforcement history or appraisals linking stimuli to the 
goals of the perceiver. In the brain however, selection of emotional stimuli does 
not employ a completely separate set of mechanisms. First of all, it is reasonab-
le to assume that all stimuli, affective or otherwise, become prioritised via 
biased neural competition. Indeed, emotional stimuli consistently enhance the 
activity in visual brain areas (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & 
Barrett, 2012; Sabatinelli et al., 2011; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). As the next 
paragraphs will explain, the sources of such modulations can lay both within the 
cognitive (or generic) attention mechanisms outlined above as well as a de-
dicated ventral affective loop. This intertwined architecture sets the stage for the 
central question of this thesis – how to disentangle contributions from different 
attention mechanisms using EEG correlates of inhibitory and excitatory as well 
as fast and slow selection processes. 
The involvement of cognitive mechanisms in affective attention is evident 
already on conceptual grounds. Given that emotions are reactions to stimuli that 
are somehow relevant for the goals of the perceiver (Frijda & Scherer, 2009), 
any information that induces emotions should by definition also attract top-
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down attention1. Many empirical findings also implicate cognitive attention 
mechanisms in affective attention phenomena (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Mohanty & 
Sussman, 2013). For instance, emotional stimuli routinely activate the fronto-
parietal attention networks (Lindquist et al., 2012). Meanwhile, occupying top-
down attention with a demanding task can disrupt prioritised processing of task-
irrelevant emotional stimuli suggesting that affective attention requires endo-
genous resources to some extent (Pessoa, 2005). Although emotional stimuli 
can sometimes also be salient (e.g. the shape of eye-brows in an angry face; 
Larson, Aronoff, Sarinopoulos, & Zhu, 2008), this is probably not a primary 
mechanism of affective attention. In summary, affective attention relies in part 
on the frontoparietal mechanisms implicated in top-down attention (Lindquist et 
al., 2012; Mohanty & Sussman, 2013; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pourtois et al., 
2013). 
In addition however, emotional attention can also tap into a separate re-
source. For instance, even stimuli that are task-irrelevant and non-salient can 
attract attention if they share an attribute with previously rewarded stimuli (re-
markably, even months after and without explicit recollection of reward 
learning; Anderson, 2013; c.f. Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011). 
In the brain, such affect-specific selection is associated with a ventral network 
comprising of the amygdala, orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices as well 
as other regions (Mitchell & Greening, 2012; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pourtois 
et al., 2013; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). Amygdala in particular is well-suited 
for affective significance detection given its bidirectional connectivity with 
visual, medial temporal as well as prefrontal regions (Kim et al., 2011). It re-
ceives rapid low-resolution visual input from the thalamus via the SC and 
pulvinar (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010) and/or from the ventral visual cortical 
pathway (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). It can also bias sensory representations via 
direct excitatory projections to visual areas (Freese & Amaral, 2006) as well as 
its connectivity with the frontoparietal attention network (e.g. Lim, Padmala, & 
Pessoa, 2009; for reviews see Anderson, 2013; Mohanty & Sussman, 2013; 
Jacobs, Renken, Aleman, & Cornelissen, 2012). Based on these arguments, the 
model on Figure 1 construes an affective significance map that biases sensory 
representation both directly as well as indirectly via the priority map. 
 
 
  
                                                 
1  Although the opposite – that all events attracting attention must be emotional – is not 
true, the laboratory study of cognitive attention often in fact involves affective processes. 
Experimental study of attention usually requires particular responses (e.g. react to an onset) 
that are encouraged by explicit (e.g. a squirt of juice to an animal) or implicit (e.g. gratitude 
of the experimenter) rewards, thus rendering task-relevant stimuli also reward-relevant. 
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1.2. Aims and hypotheses 
In summary, the existing literature suggests that affective attention involves 
amplification of emotional representations by ventral (i.e. subcortical, affective) 
as well as dorsal (i.e. cortical, cognitive, top-down) attention systems (Mitchell 
& Greening, 2012; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pourtois et al., 2013; Tamietto & 
de Gelder, 2010; Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009). An overarching aim of this 
thesis is to better understand how these mechanisms interact. To this end, the 
studies presented here deploy as well as develop EEG correlates of specific 
aspects of affective attention such as early and late processing stages and excita-
tory and inhibitory gain control. Using this strategy, the individual publications 
reveal (a) that affective attention is more automatic on early than later pro-
cessing stages (Studies I to III); (b) that affective attention may make different 
use of excitatory and inhibitory biasing (Studies II and III); and (c) that EEG 
correlates of affective attention benefit the investigation of broader emotional 
phenomena (Studies II, IV and V).  
Beyond these contributions, the findings from Studies I to III are also used to 
construct extended hypotheses for future research. These specify (a) how the 
ventral and dorsal bias signals may be differentiated using EEG dynamics, and 
(b) how distinct processing stages may emerge from the mechanisms depicted 
on Figure 1. 
 
Individual publications 
Studies I to IV help to differentiate stages of affective attention. Specifically, 
activity between 150 and 350 ms was linked to initial large-capacity scanning of 
stimulus representations for motivational significance (the first stage) while 
subsequent dynamics were associated with capacity-limited elaboration of 
selected stimuli, presumably in WM (the second stage; Codispoti, Ferrari, & 
Bradley, 2007; Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006). Often, a 
further dissociation between processes occurring before and after 500 ms within 
the second stage was also observed. These distinctions support, explicitly in 
Study I and more implicitly in others, the hypothesis that affective attention is 
more automatic on the first than the second processing stage (c.f. Pessoa, 2010; 
Pourtois et al., 2013). Several studies also suggest that during the second stage, 
the dorsal and ventral attention signals become gradually more and more 
integrated. These findings have implications for emotion regulation (Study II) 
as well as affective time distortions research (Study IV). 
Meanwhile, Studies II and III indicated that excitatory and inhibitory signals 
may serve different functions in affective attention. In principle, sensory 
competition can be biased both by amplifying the representations of targets as 
well as inhibiting those of distractors (e.g. Luck et al., 1997; Moran & Desi-
mone, 1985; Reynolds et al., 1999). While the former mechanism is often impli-
cated in affective attention, the role of inhibition is relatively less appreciated in 
affective compared to cognitive attention literature (e.g. Foxe & Snyder, 2011). 
Building on relevant advances in cognitive neuroscience (Klimesch, Sauseng, & 
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Hanslmayr, 2007), Study III suggests that emotionally elicited posterior power 
dynamics in EEG upper alpha frequency band may reflect inhibitory biasing of 
visual representations by affective attention. Adoption of this framework is 
argued to explain a seemingly unexpected correlation between alpha power and 
emotional arousal as well as generate intriguing hypothesis for the study of 
concurrent task demands and affective tuning phenomena. The need to re-think 
the meaning of alpha oscillations in affective neuroscience is further illustrated 
in Study V. Meanwhile, Study II conceptualises occipital theta power in terms 
of excitatory bias signals and demonstrates the usefulness of this parameter for 
emotion regulation research. Additional analyses of theta modulations in Study 
I presented in this thesis replicate some of these findings as well as confirm 
differences between affective modulations of alpha and theta. 
 
Extended hypotheses 
In addition to the particular contribution of each study, their findings were also 
integrated in order to develop a set of extended hypotheses for future research. 
These were derived mostly from Studies I to III which rely on two distinct but 
similar experiments. In both paradigms, participants viewed affective images 
with concurrent tasks which changed the target status of affective stimuli for 
ventral and dorsal attention systems. When participants were asked (Studies I 
and III) or left (Study II) to process the emotional meaning of the pictures, 
affective stimulus features became targets for both the ventral and the dorsal 
systems. However, when they engaged in non-affective mental activity, the 
ventral system presumably continued to target the affective aspects of the 
images while the dorsal system was otherwise engaged (to a different degree in 
different experiments). Comparing the data measured in these two conditions 
can thus reveal the neural correlates of the respective systems. This insight was 
used to search for (a) links between alpha, theta and event-related potential 
(ERP) dynamics on one hand and downstream effects of ventral and dorsal 
attention systems on the other; as well as (b) information flow patterns along the 
pathways prescribed by Figure 1 that would best explain the findings from 
Studies I to III. 
The resulting hypotheses assume that differences in posterior EEG dynamics 
between responses to affective and neutral stimuli are mostly caused by affec-
tive attention signals arriving at sensory brain regions (Hajcak, MacNamara, & 
Olvet, 2010; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008; Schupp et al., 2006). 
Within this framework, different EEG parameters may reflect different mixtures 
of signals originating from the ventral and dorsal systems. In combination, the 
idea that alpha oscillations are generated by inhibitory input (Klimesch et al., 
2007) and the existence of only excitatory direct connections from the amygdala 
to visual cortices (Freese & Amaral, 2006) suggest that posterior alpha power 
may exclusively reflect the bias signals arriving from the dorsal rather than the 
ventral attention system. Meanwhile, both ERP and theta power dynamics 
should capture excitatory input. Although subcortical origins of theta oscilla-
tions cannot be ruled out (Lewis, 2005), the present findings suggest this fre-
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quency band too may reflect predominantly dorsal biasing (c.f. Sauseng, Gries-
mayr, Freunberger, & Klimesch, 2010). This leaves ERPs to be the broadest 
measure of both ventral and dorsal excitatory modifications of sensory repre-
sentations (e.g. Sabatinelli, Keil, Frank, & Lang, 2013). In summary, the first 
set of extended hypotheses suggests that while dorsal biasing is probably 
reflected in all measures analysed here, the additional contributions from the 
ventral system should be most visible in ERPs, less visible in theta and absent 
from alpha dynamics. 
A second set of extended hypotheses constitutes a process model explaining 
how different stages of affective attention observed in the present as well as 
previous studies can emerge from the structure depicted on Figure 1 (see 
numbers there). For simplicity, the hypotheses omit processes involving the 
saliency map which only occasionally selects affective stimuli. Using the re-
maining nodes, the first stage is hypothesised to begin after the arrival of visual 
information at the ventral affective and dorsal relevance maps. These respond 
by emitting feedback signals aimed at biasing sensory representations, while the 
affective significance map is also relayed to the WM. Crucially, for some 
reason (e.g. cortical computations take more time) only direct signals from the 
ventral system arrive at the sensory cortices during the first processing stage. 
Meanwhile the output from the priority map, reflecting affective as well as 
cognitive relevance, complements direct affective input at sensory areas only 
from the second processing stage onwards. The present results also suggest that 
the dorsal and the ventral signals may be combined additively at the beginning 
of the second stage and interactively thereafter. Possibly, the WM compares the 
affective and goal-relevance maps and in case of a mismatch either (a) updates 
the relevance signals travelling to the priority map or (b) maintains the 
relevance map and inhibits the affective map instead. Both types of processes 
can conceivably produce relatively late interactive effects on sensory cortices. 
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2. AUTOMATICITY ACROSS THE STAGES  
OF AFFECTIVE ATTENTION 
One manifestation of our limited understanding of the ventral-dorsal interplay 
in affective attention is the on-going debate about its automaticity (Dolan & 
Vuilleumier, 2003; Pessoa, 2005). In terms of Figure 1, this contention concerns 
the independence of affective significance mapping from dorsal control. This 
question also relates to the suitability of conceptualising affective attention in 
terms of two processing stages implicated in some models of cognitive atten-
tion. To address these interrelated aims, Study I investigated the automaticity of 
affective attention across different stages reflected in ERP components.  
 
 
2.1. The automaticity debate and  
two-stage accounts of affective attention 
For affective attention to be considered automatic, emotional stimulus prioriti-
zation should not require awareness, intention or effort nor be easy to control 
(Bargh, 1994). On the level of brain mechanisms, most of these aspects relate to 
the extent to which the ventral affective system can operate without engaging 
the dorsal top-down system. Operationalized in this manner, the automaticity of 
affective attention seems to be substantial but limited. For instance, amygdala 
can respond to emotional stimuli presented outside of awareness (Öhman, 2002) 
or focus of endogenous attention (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003), but only as long 
as at least some top-down resources remain available (Pessoa, 2005).  
One way to reconcile the conflicting findings is to assume that affective 
attention is more automatic at an early compared to a later processing stage. For 
instance, Luo and colleagues (2010) studied amygdala responses to task-irrele-
vant emotional faces under variable cognitive loads using MEG source re-
construction. They found a load-independent emotional enhancement of amyg-
dala activity during 40 – 140 ms that was removed by high but not low cogni-
tive load between 280 – 340 ms. A study using intracranial recordings from an 
epilepsy patient also found task-independent amygdala responses to emotional 
expressions between 140 and 290 ms followed by an interactive effect from 710 
ms onwards whereby amygdala responded only to the emotionality of spatially 
attended faces (Pourtois, Spinelli, Seeck, & Vuilleumier, 2010). Although these 
findings remain inconclusive (Pessoa, 2010), they suggest that affective atten-
tion may contain dissociable stages characterised by varying degrees of dorsal 
control over ventral bias signals. 
Different stages of processing have also been implicated in cognitive atten-
tion research (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Chun & Potter, 1995; Itti & Koch, 
2001; Olivers & Meeter, 2008; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994). These 
accounts construe a first stage populated by coarse stimulus representations at 
the verge of awareness that become available for large-capacity attention 
mechanisms. A few stimuli then pass on to a second stage, where their repre-
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sentations are consolidated and elaborated in a limited-capacity system often 
equated with working memory2. These stages have already been implicated in 
affective context, for instance to explain automatic attention capture by some 
emotional stimuli in visual search tasks (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). 
However, as the brain mechanisms of early cognitive and affective attention 
may differ (see Figure 1), the suitability of two stage accounts for affective 
attention remains to be specified. 
Given its excellent temporal resolution, EEG is well suited for studying the 
phases of stimulus processing. In particular, two ERP components elicited by 
complex stimuli3  – the Early Posterior Negativity (EPN, 150–300 ms from 
stimulus onset) and the Late Positive Potential (LPP, from 300 ms onwards) – 
appear to represent different underlying processing stages (e.g. Codispoti et al., 
2007; Schupp, Stockburger, Codispoti, et al., 2007; for a review see Schupp et 
al., 2006). For instance, these components exhibit different sensitivities to top-
down attention (Schupp, Stockburger, Bublatzky, et al., 2007) and stimulus 
repetitions (Codispoti et al., 2007) suggesting that the EPN is respectively more 
automatic and more resistant to emotional adaptation than the LPP.  
 
 
2.2. Study I “Unintentionality of affective attention  
across visual processing stages” 
In Study I, the dual-stage interpretation of EPN and LPP dynamics was re-
cruited to investigate the possible stage-dependence of the automaticity of 
affective attention. More specifically, the study focussed on the unintentionality 
aspect of automaticity by testing if emotional stimuli elicit stronger responses 
than neutral ones without an explicit motivation to process their affective 
meaning. In order to avoid confounding unintentionality with effortlessness, the 
processing intention was diverted without inducing high cognitive loads. 
Specifically, participants viewed affective images with instructions to evaluate 
                                                 
2  Stages of attention are related to, but should not be confused with two sweeps of visual 
stimulus processing. The act of perception is thought to involve bidirectional flows of 
information along hierarchical brain regions (Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). An 
initial feed-forward sweep translates retinal input into coarse representations projected 
rapidly through the visual hierarchy and onwards to the PFC and other areas. The latter 
respond with top-down modulatory signals propagated in a reverse hierarchical order 
(Gilbert & Sigman, 2007). A second, re-entrant ascending sweep then integrates bottom-up 
and top-down information into a consistent representation. For simple stimuli, the first 
sweep may occur between 80 and 120 ms and the second from 200 ms onwards (Lamme & 
Roelfsema, 2000). While the second of the two attention stages undoubtedly requires re-
entrant processing, the earlier one is also likely to involve at least some feedback from 
attentional source regions (Roelfsema, Lamme, & Spekreijse, 2000). The two attention 
stages may thus map onto iterative loops of re-entrant processing. 
3  Simpler targets such as emotional words or faces may also systematically modulate 
earlier components such as the C1 (60–80 ms) and P1/N1 (100–150 ms; Pourtois, Schettino, 
& Vuilleumier, 2013) whose relationships to the processing stages are not specified here. 
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either their internal emotional experiences or physical stimulus features. The 
latter evaluation presumably removed the explicit intention to process affective 
stimulus meaning even while it remained as demanding as the former task. As a 
result, emotional content was affectively significant in both conditions but also 
goal-relevant in only one. 
Slightly different subsamples of 85 healthy participants of the same experi-
ment provided data for Studies I, III and V. In this experiment, depictions of 
affective scenes from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) were used as stimuli. Evocative photographs com-
bine relatively high emotional intensity (compared to, for example facial 
expressions or emotional words; Thom et al., 2013) with reasonable control 
over confounding stimulus features (compared to emotional films or autobio-
graphic memories). In Studies I and III, the remaining covariance between 
affective and perceptual stimulus features (Delplanque, N’Diaye, Scherer, & 
Grandjean, 2007) was also statistically controlled for. Five stimulus sets were 
compiled in order to elicit different manifestations of core affect – low arousal 
pleasant, high arousal pleasant (erotic), low arousal unpleasant and high arousal 
unpleasant (aversive) as well as a neutral baseline category (see Study III for 
image numbers; Table 1 in Study III and Figure 1 in Study V for subjective 
ratings). Different image sets balanced for affective ratings, picture content and 
layout were presented with different evaluative tasks. Participants reported the 
valence and arousal of the experiences generated by each picture in the affective 
task, and their luminance and the number of visible objects in the non-affective 
condition. The tasks were presented sequentially with three repetitions of 60 
images in pseudo-randomised order in each. The order and set pairing of tasks 
were counter-balanced across participants. Each image was presented for 1.5 
seconds after a 1.5 second fixation cross and followed by two consecutive 9-
point rating scales. 
EEG was recorded using 32 scalp and 4 ocular electrodes. Ocular artefacts 
were corrected using Independent Component Analysis and the remaining ones 
minimized by removing noisy channels and segments. ERP components were 
defined using a difference wave between the maximal emotional and the neutral 
response (i.e. an affective envelope). While in many previous studies the LPP 
has been analysed as a unitary phenomenon or parsed arbitrarily, the affective 
envelope revealed a data-driven distinction between early P3-like (P3) and late 
Slow Wave (SW) portions of the LPP.  
Note that the terminology of Study I diverges somewhat from the present 
text. While the adjectives “bottom-up” and “ascending” are reserved for exoge-
nous cognitive attention here, they are synonymous with automatic affective 
attention in the original publication. 
A consistent set of results emerged in Study I whereby affective as well as 
task effects on each of the analysed components were slightly but significantly 
different. The EPN (175–300 ms) was enhanced by erotic, aversive and 
unpleasant stimuli; P3 (300–500 ms) by erotic and aversive images and the SW 
(500–1500 ms) by all emotional categories in a roughly arousal-dependent 
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manner. Meanwhile, the intention to process emotional meaning did not 
modulate the EPN, additively enhanced amplitudes during the P3 and inter-
actively during the SW. 
These findings support the time-dependent automaticity hypotheses (Luo et 
al., 2010; Pourtois et al., 2010). More specifically, early stages of affective 
attention indexed by the EPN were completely independent of intentions to 
encode stimuli in affective terms while later stages were not. Note that this 
diverges from at least one observation that a demanding effortlessness manipu-
lation can also attenuate affective EPN modulations (Schupp, Stockburger, 
Bublatzky, et al., 2007). In combination, the two studies indicate that explicit 
motivation is not required for early affective stimulus prioritisation, even while 
the availability of some processing resources may be.  
The present results further revealed that emotional meaning extraction conti-
nued throughout the later stages of unintentional processing, suggesting that 
dorsal mechanisms complemented rather than dominated the ventral system. 
Similar simultaneous affective and cognitive attention effects on the LPP have 
been reported for both unintentionality (e.g. Schupp, Stockburger, Codispoti, et 
al., 2007; Weinberg, Hilgard, Bartholow, & Hajcak, 2012) and effortlessness 
manipulations (e.g. Ferrari, Codispoti, Cardinale, & Bradley, 2008). 
For the extended hypotheses of this thesis, the absence of task effects on 
EPN amplitudes suggests that signals originating from the ventral attention 
system may dominate sensory biasing between 175 and 300 ms. In the present 
paradigm, emotional features were targeted by ventral as well as dorsal systems 
in the affective condition but by the ventral system alone in the non-affective 
condition. The lack of differences between the two tasks in EPN amplitudes 
therefore suggests that the ventral system determined the early affective effects 
in both conditions. It can thus be hypothesised that only direct ventral input 
reached sensory representations during the first stage of affective attention 
reflected in the EPN. This suggestion aligns with findings that amygdala can 
respond within (Pourtois et al., 2010) or even before (Luo et al., 2010) the EPN 
time window and its downstream effects can contribute to affective ERP 
modulations (Sabatinelli et al., 2013). 
Another implication for the extended hypotheses can be inferred from the 
finding that the intention to process emotional meaning increased the P3 equally 
in response to affective as well as neutral pictures but modulated SW ampli-
tudes roughly in proportion with stimulus arousal. The emergence of a task 
effect first of all indicates that the dorsal priority map joined the ventral affec-
tive map in modulating ERP responses from 300 ms onwards. Secondly, the 
subtle differences between the task sensitivities of the P3 and the SW may 
reflect some sort of integration of different bias signals. More specifically, the 
additive modulations of the P3 can be explained by dorsal priority signals 
blending with the ventral ones in an additive manner (either at the sensory 
cortices or the priority map). Meanwhile, the interactive SW response may 
reflect the modulatory impact of working memory. For instance, the WM may 
have downgraded the affective significance of emotional stimuli in the non-
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affective condition or enhanced their goal-relevance in the affective condition in 
proportion with stimulus arousal. 
 
 
2.3. Conclusions 
In Study I, the question of the automaticity of affective attention was related to 
stages of attention captured by ERPs on one hand (Schupp et al., 2006) and 
specific aspects of automaticity on the other (Bargh, 1994). Such temporal and 
definitional specificity helped to delineate the boundaries of automatic prioriti-
sation of emotional representations. Specifically, taken together with com-
parable previous studies, the findings suggest that early affective attention is 
completely unintentional, even if it may not be infinitely effortless. Meanwhile, 
the second processing stage exhibited a combination of affective significance 
and top-down relevance effects. More broadly, these findings support the idea 
that despite relying on partially different substrates, both affective and cognitive 
attention can be characterised by two processing stages. The study also 
contributed to the extended hypothesis by suggesting that subcortical as well as 
cortical bias signals both contribute to posterior ERPs. The findings also sug-
gested that direct ventral affective biasing remained exclusive before 300 ms 
and became complemented by dorsal priority signals only after that, in an in 
increasingly integrative manner. 
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3. THETA AND EXCITATORY GAIN CONTROL 
The preceding chapter illustrated the benefits of linking different EEG time 
windows to distinct underlying processing stages. The current and following 
chapters suggest that extraction of theta and alpha dynamics may provide 
similar gains by differentiating excitatory and inhibitory bias signals, respecti-
vely. The temporal and spectral distinctions are also combined to further in-
crease the specificity of EEG correlates of affective attention. 
 
 
3.1. Excitatory and inhibitory gain control reflected  
in EEG frequencies 
Scalp EEG is probably generated by synchronized voltage fluctuations within 
spatially aligned cortical local field potentials (LFP; Lopes da Silva, 2013). The 
captured LFP oscillations may in turn synchronise single cell activity and there-
by help to maintain local as well as global distributed brain networks underlying 
various psychological functions (Basar, Basar-Eroglu, Karakas, & Schürmann, 
2001; Buzsaki & Draguhn, 2004; Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001; Fries, 2005; 
Salinas & Sejnowski, 2001; Ward, 2003). More specifically, firing with the 
same rhythm enhances communication between neural populations. Synchrony 
can thereby form transient “software” networks on fixed connectivity “hard-
ware”, maximizing computational power and flexibility of the brain (Fries, 
2005). As it happens, these functional networks may use distinct frequency 
bands to become synchronised. Although the relationships tend to vary between 
brain areas, tasks and participants (Başar & Güntekin, 2012), a rule of thumb 
relates slower oscillations such as theta (4–7 Hz) and alpha (8–13 Hz) to long-
distance communication while faster ones such as gamma (40–90 Hz) may be 
involved in networks formed within rather than between cortical areas (von 
Stein & Sarnthein, 2000; Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001). 
Brain oscillations are particularly relevant for attention processes (Womels-
dorf & Fries, 2007). On the local level, attentional biasing may manifest in 
enhanced synchrony among neurons encoding attended stimuli (Deco & Thiele, 
2009; Womelsdorf & Fries, 2007). For instance, neural representations of the 
targets of attention become more synchronised in the gamma range than 
neighbouring cells representing unattended distractors (Fries, Reynolds, Rorie, 
& Desimone, 2001). Global synchrony on the other hand is probably involved 
in relaying bias signals from sources of attention such as the frontoparietal 
network to targets such as the visual cortex (Deco & Thiele, 2009; Ward, 2003; 
Womelsdorf & Fries, 2007). Given the proposed inverse relationship between 
distance and frequency, these long-range networks probably use beta (Gross et 
al., 2004), alpha (Foxe & Snyder, 2011; Ward, 2003), and theta (Sauseng et al., 
2010) oscillations, although gamma coupling has also been observed (e.g. Gre-
goriou, Gotts, Zhou, & Desimone, 2009). 
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Within this framework, Studies II and III explore the involvement of theta 
and alpha dynamics in affective attention. Both papers assume that synchro-
nised communication between distant brain areas enhances local synchrony 
within the participating regions. This in turn amplifies oscillatory power picked 
up by adjacent scalp electrodes, rendering the latter a measure of underlying 
event-related synchronisation (ERS) and desynchronization (ERD; Pfurtscheller 
& Lopes da Silva, 1999). Given these premises, posterior theta and alpha power 
may reflect the extent to which sensory representations are incorporated into 
large-scale brain networks oscillating at the analysed frequency. Although the 
precise composition of these networks cannot be determined from the EEG 
signal alone, they may well involve the substrate of attention given the proposed 
role of theta oscillations in information integration for cognitive as well as 
affective purposes (Lewis, 2005; Roux & Uhlhaas, 2014; Sauseng et al., 2010; 
Womelsdorf, Vinck, Leung, & Everling, 2010); and implication of alpha in 
selective cortical inhibition and top-down control (Foxe & Snyder, 2011; Jensen 
& Mazaheri, 2010; Klimesch et al., 2007). 
 
 
3.2. Theta and affective attention 
Theta dynamics have been implicated in a wide range of cognitive phenomena 
such as decision-making (Womelsdorf et al., 2010), spatial navigation (Buzsáki, 
2005), multimodal perception (Basar, Schürmann, & Sakowitz, 2001), sensori-
motor integration (Cruikshank, Singhal, Hueppelsheuser, & Caplan, 2011), 
action monitoring (Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 2012; Mitchell, 
McNaughton, Flanagan, & Kirk, 2008), episodic memory (Nyhus & Curran, 
2010) and in particular, working memory (Roux & Uhlhaas, 2014; Sauseng et 
al., 2010).  
A common function performed by theta dynamics in these different pro-
cesses may be the integration of distributed neural representations, including 
binding sensory representations with central WM mechanisms (Roux & Uhl-
haas, 2014; Sauseng et al., 2010). Given the overlap between WM and attention, 
theta oscillations may thus also mediate sensory biasing originating from 
cortical as well as subcortical affective attention regions (Lewis, 2005; Womels-
dorf et al., 2010). Indeed, theta power has been observed to correlate with 
affective content (Aftanas, Reva, Varlamov, Pavlov, & Makhnev, 2004; Knya-
zev, Slobodskoj-Plusnin, & Bocharov, 2009), emotional arousal (e.g. Aftanas, 
Varlamov, Pavlov, Makhnev, & Reva, 2002; Balconi & Lucchiari, 2006), as 
well as negative valence of visual stimuli (Balconi, Brambilla, & Falbo, 2009a; 
Sun, Sun, Wang, & Gong, 2012; for reviews see Bekkedal, Rossi III, & 
Panksepp, 2011; Knyazev, 2007). Various lines of evidence thus suggest that 
theta oscillations may facilitate communication between the source and target 
regions of affective attention. On this backdrop, Study II proposes posterior 
theta power to be a measure of re-entrant amplification of affective stimulus 
representations by emotional attention. 
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3.3. Study II “Using distraction to regulate emotion: 
insights from theta dynamics” 
Beyond contributions to emotion regulation literature elaborated in the publi-
cation, Study II also has implication for affective attention research. Distraction, 
the emotion regulation strategy of interest in the study, dampens emotional re-
actions by precluding full comprehension of affective situations (Gross, 1998, 
2013; Koole, 2009). For instance, the distress of a dental procedure can be 
mitigated by actively visualizing more pleasant circumstances. At closer 
inspection, doing so interferes specifically with affective attention processes. 
Even while mentally time travelling, the dental patient remains aware of the 
actual situation. Instead of completely preventing the representation of evoca-
tive stimuli, distraction thus predominantly reduces the processing advantage 
these stimuli would otherwise receive, i.e. affective attention. Framed in these 
terms, distraction becomes a tool for discovering the neural correlates of 
affective attention – if occipital theta indeed results from attentional biasing, it 
should thus be modulated when participants engage in distraction. 
Data from an earlier experiment (Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes, Ryd-
strom, & Gross, 2011) were reanalysed for Study II. EEG was recorded while 
18 participants (9 men) viewed neutral and unpleasant IAPS images with and 
without instructions to regulate ensuing emotions using distraction and reapp-
raisal. For distraction, they were instructed to engage in emotionally neutral 
mental imagery (visualise geometrical designs or neighbourhood sceneries) and 
for reappraisal to construe the unpleasant images in neutral terms. Similar 
regulation manipulations have proved to be effective in numerous previous 
studies (McRae et al., 2010; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012) and were also 
shown to elicit expected self-report and ERP dynamics in the present dataset 
(Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). Unregulated viewing of neutral and negative 
stimuli together with one type of regulation trials were presented in random 
order in one of four blocks. Two seconds prior to the onset of each stimulus, a 
cue introduced the type of the upcoming trial. Stimuli were presented for 5 
seconds followed by affective rating scales. EEG data from 48 electrodes were 
pre-processed in a similar manner to other studies in this thesis. Event-related 
spectral perturbations (ERSP) computed using Morlet wavelets with variable 
cycles were averaged within individually-defined theta bands (3–8 Hz) at 
occipital electrodes. 
The results revealed two event-related synchronisation peaks (150–350 and 
350 – 550 ms) followed by a sustained power level (see Figure 2 in Study II). 
Experimental modulations of these dynamics could indeed be explained by 
considering theta power as a selective correlate of affective attention. First of 
all, in the unregulated conditions, negative images generated more theta than 
neutral ones throughout the analysis window (c.f. Balconi et al., 2009a; Sun et 
al., 2012). This can be explained by unpleasant representations being more 
vigorously incorporated into affective attention networks than neutral ones. 
From the second ERS peak onwards however, distraction but not reappraisal 
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reduced the theta response to unpleasant images down to, and later even below 
the level generated by neutral images (c.f. Zhang et al., 2013). The dissociation 
between distraction and reappraisal is particularly informative here, given that 
both regulation strategies explicitly asked participants to feel neutral in response 
to the stimuli and also induced some cognitive load. Nevertheless, theta ERS 
was exclusively modulated by distraction suggesting this EEG feature correlates 
with something that is unique to this particular regulation strategy, such as 
affective attention. 
These results underlie the extended hypothesis that theta power predomi-
nantly reflects bias signals arriving from the cortical priority map (Sauseng et 
al., 2010). The distraction instruction asking participants to visualize geometric 
objects or familiar neighbourhoods presumably reduced the goal-relevance of 
affective images as well as the availability of resources for processing them. In 
oscillatory terms, this probably manifested in enhanced synchrony between 
cortical WM areas and regions required for mental imagery coupled with 
reduced synchrony between the central regions and external stimulus repre-
sentations. The ensuing loss of synchrony in sensory areas is a plausible expla-
nation for the abrupt reduction of occipital theta power from 350 ms onwards. 
In terms of Figure 1, theta could therefore be considered a measure of the extent 
to which sensory representations receive excitatory re-entrant input from the 
priority map. 
While Study II associated occipital theta with dorsal bias signals, it remained 
less clear on the role of direct inputs from the ventral system. On one hand, 
theta power was sensitive to emotional content already during the first pro-
cessing stage that was associated with direct amygdala input in Study I (see also 
Aftanas et al., 2002; Knyazev et al., 2009). Theta ERS may thus reflect the 
excitatory input arriving from both dorsal and ventral sources. On the other 
hand however, the early affective effect might also have dorsal origins as the 
preparatory cue gave affective significance information time to travel from the 
amygdala to the priority map. Further research is thus needed for informed 
hypothesis about the extent to which occipital theta power reflects direct 
amygdala input to visual cortices. 
To some extent, this question can be addressed using data from Study I. 
Replication of other aspects of Study II is also advisable due to its small sample 
size and the absence of a condition where distraction would have been applied 
to neutral stimuli. This common time-saving feature of emotion regulation 
paradigms leaves it unclear if theta power tracks prioritised processing of all 
external stimuli or is specific to the fate of affective ones. 
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3.4. Theta modulations in Study I 
Given the similarities between Studies I and II, the affective sensitivities of 
theta power observed in Study II should also be visible in Study I. Both 
experiments contained a pair of conditions where affective stimuli were either 
task-relevant (affective evaluations in Study I and passive viewing in Study II) 
or task-irrelevant (non-affective evaluations and distraction, respectively). 
These manipulations differed, however, by the extent to which processing 
resources were occupied in the task-irrelevant condition (low in Study I, high in 
Study II). Data from Study I can therefore be also used to test if occipital theta 
ERS tracks the availability of processing resources or alternatively, the 
intentions to process visual representations. Finally, the full-factorial design of 
Study I enables to ask if this tracking is selective to affective stimuli or not. 
To these ends, theta perturbations were computed from the data of Study I 
using settings similar to Studies II and III (Morlet wavelets between 2–10 Hz; 
1–5 cycles; full trial normalization; –1500 to –500 ms baseline). The per-
turbations were averaged within individually defined theta band between 3– 
8 Hz at O1, Oz, O2, PO3 and PO4 electrodes and time windows spanning 100–
300 and 300–600 ms (see Figure 2). Average power levels were analysed using 
repeated measures ANOVA with factors for picture category and task as well as 
their interaction. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values and results of Tukey 
post-hoc tests of these analyses are reported here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Task-relevance effect on occipital theta perturbations in Study I data. The 
shaded area denotes significant differences between conditions (paired t-test, false 
discovery rate corrected p < .05) 
 
 
As can be seen on Figure 2, the dual-peaked ERS observed in Study II was 
broadly replicated in Study I. The modulations of the first peak however, were 
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quite different between the two experiments. Instead of a clear valence 
sensitivity observed in Study II, stimulus category had a non-affective effect on 
early theta ERS in Study I data (F(4,312) = 5.28, ηp2 = .06, p < .001; pleasant 
images induced more power at p < .001 than erotic ones without either extreme 
being significantly different from undistinguished responses to neutral, pleasant 
and unpleasant images in between them). Task main effect (F(1,78) = 0.13, ηp2 
= .001, p = .71) as well as the task-by-picture interaction F(4,312) = 0.17, ηp2 = 
.002, p = .95) were not significant. Taken together, these results reiterate the 
need for caution in linking early theta ERS to emotional biasing. Being early 
and occipital, the signal may also or instead reflect processing of physical 
stimulus features that can co-vary with affective dimensions in the IAPS 
(Delplanque et al., 2007). 
Meanwhile, the second ERS dynamics were broadly similar in Studies I and 
II. Unlike the first peak, the second one was clearly sensitive to affective 
content (see Figure 2; F(3,314) = 11.27, ηp2 = .13, p < .001; all affective images 
differed from neutral at p < .001 but not form each-other beyond trend level). 
Also in line with Study II, the second peak of Study I exhibited sensitivity to the 
task-relevance manipulation whereby power was decreased when emotional 
stimulus features ceased to be task-relevant (c.f. Figure 1 in Study II and Figure 
2 here; F(1,78) = 31.56, ηp2 = .29, p < .001). Given that unlike distraction, the 
nonaffective task in Study I did not substantially consume processing resources, 
this finding links theta power to the goal-relevance of emotional stimuli in 
addition to their engagement of capacity-limited resources. In summary, its 
sensitivity to goal-relevance indicates that the second occipital theta peak may 
reflect biasing originating primarily from the priority map. 
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Figure 3. Affective and task-relevance effects on the second theta ERS peak in data 
from Study I. 
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3.5. Conclusions 
Two valence-sensitive power peaks were observed in occipital theta in Study II, 
the second of which was selectively attenuated by using distraction to regulate 
emotions. Insofar as distraction disrupts prioritised rather than entire processing 
of emotional stimuli, this result renders occipital theta power a neural correlate 
of affective attention. Re-analysis of data from Study I replicated the task-sensi-
tive dual-peaked nature of occipital theta dynamics as well as helped to further 
specify the conceptual origins of the second peak. As it was attenuated by non-
affective tasks in both studies, it may be sensitive not only to the availability of 
processing resources (restricted in Study II, but not in Study I) but also to the 
intention to process affective meaning (restricted in both studies). This pattern 
can be explained by considering occipital theta power a reflection of the extent 
to which sensory representations are synchronised with the dorsal top-down 
attention system. 
In light of the extended hypotheses, the re-analysis of Study I provides an 
informative comparison between temporally overlapping theta and ERP dyna-
mics recorded from the same dataset. Within the early time window, the 
findings were very different – while ERPs reflected meaningful emotional diffe-
rences between stimulus categories, theta dynamics did not. This discrepancy 
inspired the extended hypotheses to associate occipital theta power with exci-
tatory signals originating primarily in the dorsal priority map which were 
assumed to arrive not before the second processing stage. ERPs meanwhile 
were associated with sensory modulations induced both by cortical as well as 
subcortical inputs - as the latter were assumed to be available already during the 
first stage, they can account for the early emotional effect observed in ERPs. 
The second theta peak meanwhile showed similar dynamics to the P3 com-
ponent with both exhibiting a task main effect with no interactions. Both were 
also sensitive to affective content, although theta power did not differentiate 
emotional stimuli by arousal while the P3 did. 
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4. ALPHA AND INHIBITORY GAIN CONTROL 
In the previous chapter, extraction of theta frequency dynamics from posterior 
EEG was shown to reveal predominantly cortical biasing involved in affective 
attention. This chapter extends the usefulness of spectral analyses for affective 
attention research by linking posterior alpha dynamics to inhibition of affect-
irrelevant brain processes. 
 
 
4.1. Alpha and inhibition  
of affect-irrelevant representations 
Having long been considered a simple manifestation of cortical idling, alpha 
oscillations (7–13 Hz) are increasingly associated with more meaningful 
cognitive processes (Başar & Güntekin, 2012). Prominent among these is the 
active inhibition of irrelevant brain activity (Foxe & Snyder, 2011; Hanslmayr, 
Staudigl, & Fellner, 2012; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Klimesch et al., 2007; 
Palva & Palva, 2007). For instance, alpha power increases when participants 
actively suppress competing working memory input (Klimesch, 1999) or motor 
responses (e.g. Hummel, Andres, Altenmüller, Dichgans, & Gerloff, 2002). On 
the neural level, this reconceptualization of alpha dynamics realizes that an 
inhibitory input can simultaneously reduce the intensity of neural activity and 
increase its temporal synchrony (Klimesch et al., 2007). As EEG power is 
mainly a function of synchrony, increased inhibition can therefore, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, increase rather than decrease scalp EEG amplitudes. 
Given that competition between neural representations can be biased by 
amplifying the relevant as well as by inhibiting the irrelevant (e.g. Luck et al., 
1997; Moran & Desimone, 1985; Reynolds et al., 1999), alpha oscillations have 
also been suggested to be a basic building block of selective attention (Foxe & 
Snyder, 2011; Hanslmayr, Gross, Klimesch, & Shapiro, 2011; Jensen, Bonne-
fond, & VanRullen, 2012; Klimesch, 2012). For instance, a cue shifting antici-
patory attention to one side of the visual field increases alpha power over ipsila-
teral representations of the unattended space (Worden, Foxe, Wang, & 
Simpson, 2000). The same holds in reverse – when hemispheric distribution of 
alpha is experimentally changed using transcranial magnetic stimulation, 
objects within the visual field contralateral to the stimulation become less 
visible than ipsilateral ones (Romei, Gross, & Thut, 2010). Alpha ERS also 
accompanies unattended sensory modalities (Foxe  et al., 1998; Fu et al., 2001) 
as well as perceptual features (Snyder & Foxe, 2010). Finally, posterior alpha 
dynamics can be modulated by magnetic disruption of areas within the fronto-
parietal attention network suggesting that alpha oscillations may indeed reflect 
long-distance synchronisation involved in conveying inhibitory bias signals 
from the dorsal attention system to visual cortices (Capotosto, Babiloni, 
Romani, & Corbetta, 2009). 
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4.2. Study III “EEG alpha and cortical inhibition  
in affective attention” 
Although emotion-induced alpha modulations have sometimes been reported 
(Başar & Güntekin, 2012; Knyazev, 2007), they have rarely been explained in 
inhibitory terms (e.g. Knyazev, Savostyanov, & Levin, 2006; Parvaz, 
MacNamara, Goldstein, & Hajcak, 2012). On this backdrop, Study III tested if 
inhibitory origins could explain alpha power variations in data from Study I. 
After similar pre-processing, ERSPs were calculated using Morlet wavelets 
with variable cycles. Following a preliminary mass-univariate analysis, power 
within individually defined upper alpha band (11–13 Hz) was averaged in three 
regions of interest for each trial and analysed in a mixed model ANOVA to 
detect experimental effects while controlling for perceptual confounds. 
Significant modulations were observed in upper alpha power from 350 ms 
onwards at posterior as well as central scalp areas. The central alpha dynamics 
probably reflected sensorimotor activity and are therefore not considered here. 
In posterior alpha, three main findings emerged. First, affective arousal in-
creased rather than decreased alpha power. Second, a negativity bias occurred 
whereby high, although not low arousal unpleasant images generated the 
highest alpha power levels. Third, a task-by-affect interaction occurred after  
575 ms. 
These findings were explained by relating alpha power to inhibition of 
affect-irrelevant brain processes. This enabled first of all to solve an apparent 
contradiction between previous ERP and imaging studies demonstrating affect-
induced increases in posterior brain activity (Hajcak et al., 2010; Lindquist et 
al., 2012; Sabatinelli et al., 2011) and the present findings implying the opposite 
(as higher alpha power reflects more inhibition/less activity). This inconsistency 
can be dissolved by considering alpha not as an inverse measure of brain acti-
vity but as a selective reflection of LFP synchrony generated by regions under 
top-down inhibitory control (Klimesch et al., 2007). The activity enhancements 
recorded with other methods presumably originate from the actual neural repre-
sentations of emotional stimuli that become amplified by affective attention. 
Meanwhile, neural populations encoding affect-irrelevant locations, features, 
and modalities may be simultaneously inhibited in order to bias neural com-
petition further in favour of the selected representations. Increased local 
synchrony within these distributed brain regions under inhibitory control may 
then determine scalp alpha power, especially given the spatial mixing of EEG 
sources. 
Intriguingly, the extent to which affective attention engages inhibitory gain 
control seems to vary across situations. This is suggested by comparing Study 
III to a very similar experiment where IAPS images elicited analogous LPP 
dynamics but diametrically different alpha responses with emotional arousal 
correlating negatively rather than positively with alpha power (De Cesarei & 
Codispoti, 2011). At closer inspection, this discrepancy may relate to the diffe-
rent concurrent task requirements used in these studies. Apparently, when 
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participants are asked to somehow evaluate affective images, emotional arousal 
increases alpha power (Study III; see also Aftanas et al., 2004, 2002) while an 
opposite relationship may prevail in passive viewing paradigms (Balconi, 
Brambilla, & Falbo, 2009b; De Cesarei & Codispoti, 2011). Possibly, alpha 
power reflects the variable need for inhibition of affect-irrelevant processes in 
different situations. Passive viewing generates little competition for emotional 
representations which can therefore be sufficiently amplified by excitatory 
biasing, resulting in relative increase in disinhibition and a negative correlation 
between arousal and alpha power. For affective stimuli to stand out in the 
concurrent task context however, their disinhibition needs to be complemented 
by inhibition of affect-irrelevant activity resulting in the opposite effect. Even 
while this explanation awaits further research, it suggests that alpha dynamics 
may differentiate emotional states that remain indistinguishable for other neural 
correlates of affective attention. 
A selective correlate of affect-induced inhibition may also be useful for the 
study of emotional modulations of the breadth of attention and thinking (i.e. 
affective tuning). For instance, unpleasant emotions enhance the perception of 
local as opposed to global stimulus features, presumably reflecting evolutionary 
advantages of focussing on threatening details (Fredrickson, 2004; Friedman & 
Forster, 2010; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). In the brain, narrowed attentional 
scope is likely to involve inhibition of peripheral representations which in turn 
may amplify scalp alpha power. Study III provided preliminary evidence for 
this hypothesis by showing that aversive images generated significantly more 
alpha power across all analysed scalp locations and time windows than pleasant 
or neutral pictures. Although low arousal unpleasant images did not have a 
comparable impact, they might have lacked the motivational intensity required 
for tuning effects to appear (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). 
The main contribution of Study III to the extended hypotheses of this thesis 
is the inference that if alpha power indeed reflects inhibition, then it cannot be 
generated by the direct excitatory feedback signals arriving at sensory cortices 
from the amygdala (Freese & Amaral, 2006). Given that the ventral system was 
inferred to modulate sensory representations already from 150 ms onwards (see 
Study I), this hypothesis is supported by the absence of affective modulations of 
alpha power prior to 350 ms. Alpha may thus be a highly selective measure of 
the inhibitory biasing arriving from the priority map.  
At first sight, this conclusion seems to be at odds with the absence of any 
task effects on alpha power at the beginning of the second processing stage 
(350–575 ms) despite the fact that dorsal inputs were implicated in this time 
window in Studies I and II. One way to account for this apparent anomaly is to 
assume that inhibitory biasing is computed differently than excitatory biasing. 
For instance, when sufficient calls for inhibition of affect-irrelevant activity 
have already arrived from one system (e.g. the ventral affective map), the 
priority map may ignore further calls from other systems (e.g. the relevance 
map). Such nonlinear computations of inhibitory biasing may also explain a 
task-by-affect interaction that occurred in alpha between 575 and 900 ms 
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whereby the affective task increased inhibition only for low arousal and neutral 
stimuli but not for high arousal pictures. Conceivably, the task-relevance of 
affect did not result in additional inhibitory amplification of high arousal stimuli 
which already stood out under orders from the affective map. By contrast, the 
low arousal stimuli did not elicit strong calls for inhibition from the affective 
map and had therefore room to be further biased at the behest of the goal-
relevance map. 
 
 
4.3. Conclusions 
Study III extended the inhibitory account of alpha oscillations to affective atten-
tion processes, although in a rather explorative manner. The findings first of all 
suggest that affective arousal can increase posterior alpha power in response to 
emotional stimuli, possibly when brain processes competing with emotional 
representations need to be supressed. Alpha and inhibition may also be involved 
in constricting the breadth of attention under sufficiently intense unpleasant 
affect. Compared with posterior theta and ERP dynamics, alpha responses to 
emotional stimuli were markedly different showing an affective main effect at 
the beginning of the second stage and a unique interaction following it. These 
findings primarily indicate that inhibitory biasing of sensory representations 
does not mirror excitatory inputs captured by theta and ERP dynamics. Instead, 
the extended hypotheses propose alpha power to reflect the output of the 
priority map that is determined by a nonlinear combination of subcortical 
affective significance and prefrontal goal-relevance. 
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5. EEG CORRELATES  
OF AFFECTIVE ATTENTION AS TOOLS  
FOR AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
The preceding chapters have suggested that focussing on certain time windows 
as well as frequency bands can increase the specificity of EEG correlates of 
affective attention. The final chapter will now investigate the usefulness of such 
correlates for the study of broader emotional phenomena, such as emotion 
regulation, affective time modulations and approach-avoidance motivation. 
 
 
5.1. Implications for emotion regulation  
from Studies I to III 
Study II as well as Studies I and III help to specify some of the mechanisms 
involved in emotion regulation. Different strategies for regulating emotions are 
usually defined in fairly broad terms. According to an influential process model 
(Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 2007), on one hand people use methods 
aimed at removing the antecedents of emotional reactions by avoiding or 
changing the situations that would elicit them. At the other end are attempts to 
suppress or hide the ensuing emotional responses. In between these extremes 
are cognitive strategies such as distraction and reappraisal, capable of altering 
the internal unfolding of an emotional episode (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
Distraction is believed to work by restricting the allocation of processing 
resources to emotional stimuli. It has been unclear however, when exactly this 
occurs along the stages outlined in chapter 2. An earlier publication of the data 
re-analysed in Study II (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011) provided half of the 
answer – given that distraction modulated the LPP, it probably restricted the 
second stage processing of emotional stimuli. However, their fate on the first 
stage remained undetermined in this study as the EPN was not analysed. As 
occipital theta dynamics covered both stages, Study II was able to reveal that 
distraction indeed became effective only from the second stage onwards. This 
finding supports explaining distraction effectiveness in terms of capacity-
limited processing resources as the failure to halt early affective attention did 
not prevent distraction from being effective in reducing both self-reported and 
LPP-reflected emotional intensity (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).  
Note that the question of distraction effectiveness is a reversed version of the 
question of affective attention effortlessness. This conceptual link can be 
extended to other members of the attention-control family of emotion regulation 
techniques where distraction hails from (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Whereas 
distraction works by tapping into limited effortlessness of emotional attention, 
other strategies such as focussing on less emotional aspects of emotional stimuli 
need its’ unintentionality to be finite as well (compare Bargh, 1994; and 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). In this regard, Study I revealed that simply making 
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emotions task-irrelevant had no effect on early affective attention and only a 
limited impact on subsequent emotional modulations of ERPs as well as theta 
dynamics. These findings imply that substantial employment of second-stage 
capacity-limited resources (i.e. working memory) may be required for success-
ful emotion regulation by attention-control. In fact, sufficiently demanding tasks 
may also prevent the first-stage affective attention that was  found to be 
inaccessible to the distraction manipulation of Study II (Schupp, Stockburger, 
Bublatzky, et al., 2007). 
 
 
5.2. Study IV “Emotional modulation  
of attention affects time perception” 
Study IV recruited ERP correlates of processing stages (see Study I) to the 
investigation of affective modulations of subjective time (Droit-Volet & Meck, 
2007). Time perception can be modelled as a conceptual clock consisting of 
pulses emitted by a pacemaker reaching an accumulator through a switch 
(Grondin, 2010). Emotions can distort this mechanism in at least two ways. On 
one hand, affect-induced changes in bodily arousal may increase the number of 
pulses emitted by the pacemaker in one objective unit of time (e.g. Tamm et al., 
2014). This modulates the subjective flow of time, much like slow motion 
effects can be created by playing a high-frame-rate recording back at normal 
speed. On the other hand, given that the switch component needs attention to 
transfer pulses from the pacemaker to the accumulator, emotional stimuli can 
also modulate time by increasing or decreasing the resources available for that 
purpose (Schirmer, 2011). 
Study IV explored if ERP correlates of visual stimulus processing stages can 
help to distinguish the sources of time modulations. The data were collected 
from 62 students (42 females) who produced short time intervals (0.9, 1.5, 2.7 
and 3.3 seconds) while viewing erotic, aversive, and neutral IAPS images or an 
empty screen. Behaviourally, the emotional effects varied with the required 
interval. Specifically, affective distortions were observed for 0.9, 1.5 and 2.7 s 
durations. For the 0.9 s target, the intervals produced during unpleasant images 
where shorter and more variable than in neutral or pleasant trials. In the 
remaining intervals however, only pleasant stimuli significantly lengthened 
produced durations for 1.5 and shortened them for 2.7 s. The main inference 
supported by this complex pattern of results is that it cannot be explained by 
any single underlying mechanism. 
EEG was recorded and processed similarly to other studies of this thesis. 
Stimulus- as well as response-locked sections of EEG were analysed. In the 
latter, the Contingent Negative Variation (CNV) remained unrelated to pro-
duction performance as well as emotional modulations, in line with recent 
questioning (van Rijn, Kononowicz, Meck, Ng, & Penney, 2011) of the idea 
that CNV reflects the accumulation of pulses involved in time perception (Ma-
car & Vidal, 2004). Meanwhile, the stimulus-locked ERPs revealed expected 
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emotional effects whereby pleasant and unpleasant stimuli enhanced amplitudes 
equally in P1 and LPP components. The EPN however, exhibited stronger 
responses to erotic compared to aversive images (see Figure 3 in Study IV). 
These results suggest two ways how ERP correlates of affective attention 
can be useful for time perception research. First of all, the extent to which a 
stimulus captures sustained affective attention can reflect the arousal it induces. 
Thus, the absence of a valence effect throughout most of the ERP response in 
Study IV was interpreted as evidence that the behavioural differences between 
erotic and aversive time modulations cannot be ascribed to differences in the 
affective arousal induced by the stimuli. Instead, the behavioural effects may 
relate to the valence difference observed at EPN suggesting that positive images 
initially engaged the ventral attention network more vigorously than the 
unpleasant ones. This implies that the affective modulation of early attention 
may have a particular impact on the switch component of the internal clock. 
Even while Study IV did not provide conclusive evidence, it made a case for 
using a similar strategy in future research. 
 
 
5.3. Study V “Approach-avoidance activation  
without anterior asymmetry” 
In Study V, the level of affective attention attracted by stimuli was employed as 
a measure of their perceived motivational significance. Doing so helped to add-
ress a conundrum regarding the conceptual origins of anterior alpha asymmetry. 
According to a dominant biphasic model, less alpha power over left than right 
frontal hemisphere reflects more approach-motivational activity while the 
opposite pattern is associated with avoidance (Coan & Allen, 2002, 2004; 
Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010). This model explains experimental 
asymmetry shifts in response to manipulations of motivational and affective 
states as well as correlations between trait-like baseline asymmetry and out-
comes such as affective dispositions and mood disorders. However, not all 
available evidence concurs with this view (Miller, Crocker, Spielberg, Infan-
tolino, & Heller, 2013). 
Among the challengers of the biphasic model are failures to find expected 
asymmetries from EEG responses to affective images (see Study V and 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2010). The conceptual importance of such null findings 
can be summarised in a series of simple premises: affective images reliably 
elicit core affect (e.g. Bradley & Lang, 2007); core affect either overlaps with or 
is closely related to approach-avoidance motivation (e.g. Hamann, 2012); and 
approach-avoidance motivation induces anterior asymmetry (e.g Harmon-Jones 
et al., 2010). As each of these premises is individually uncontroversial, it is 
puzzling why core affect elicited by images sometimes does not induce ex-
pected shifts in asymmetry. To explain this conundrum, researchers have sug-
gested (a) that pictures lack sufficient motivational urgency and (b) that 
individually different responsiveness may mask expected effects (Gable & 
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Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones et al., 2010). Study V systematically tested 
both hypotheses, relying in part on the link between affective attention and LPP. 
More specifically, we assumed that if a stimulus attracts sufficient affective 
attention to modulate LPP amplitudes, it must be motivationally significant for 
the participant to a non-negligible degree. Therefore, the stimuli with insuffi-
cient motivational urgency for asymmetry effects to occur should also fail to 
significantly modulate LPP amplitudes. To test this, we used the data collected 
in the affective condition of the experiment analysed in Studies I and III. 
Asymmetries were calculated from ERSPs quantified in a similar manner to 
Study III. To assess individual differences, the data were analysed using a 
mixed model ANOVA capable of isolating three sources of variability: the 
stimulus effect together with stimulus-independent as well as stimulus-depen-
dent individual differences (Stemmler & Wacker, 2010). 
The results rather compellingly revealed significant and expected LPP 
modulations (also reported in Study I) together with a complete lack of stimulus 
effects on anterior asymmetry. The mixed model analyses also assured that 
expected asymmetries were not concealed by individual differences. Given that 
both previously proposed explanations for the affective images conundrum were 
not supported, the study calls for renewed search for alternative explanations. 
To this end, the findings implicated the role of stimulus-independent individual 
differences, either truly trait-like or induced by the experimental setting. For 
instance, faced with unpredictable encounters with highly arousing stimuli some 
participants might have experienced anxious apprehension or engaged in 
spontaneous emotion regulation, both of which have been related to frontal 
brain asymmetries. Note also that an important building block for a revised 
model of anterior asymmetry may be the inhibitory account discussed in Study 
III (Miller et al., 2013; Parvaz et al., 2012). 
 
 
5.4. Conclusions 
The wide conceptual scope of the problems addressed in this chapter illustrates 
the broader usefulness of EEG correlates of emotional attention for affective 
neuroscience. Studies IV and V demonstrated how LPP as the currently best 
understood EEG measure of emotional attention can be used to characterise 
experimentally generated affective states, with higher temporal resolution and 
resistance to reporting bias that traditional self-report manipulation checks. 
More provisionally, Study IV recommended using the link between ERP com-
ponents and processing stages to isolate emotional attention effects on time 
perception. The promise of this approach was further illustrated by Study II, 
where the two-stage interpretation of theta dynamics helped to specify some of 
the mechanisms involved in emotion regulation by distraction.  
The usefulness of EEG correlates of affective attention need of course not be 
confined to these contexts. Affective attention is relatively unique among 
emotional process in that its subcortical dynamics are relayed to cortical areas 
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and can thereby be picked up by EEG. In this regard, the extended hypotheses 
of this thesis may further enhance the specificity with which EEG dynamics can 
be related to underlying processes. For instance, if ERPs indeed reflect both 
subcortical and cortical biases while theta power is more confined to the latter, 
their combined use may help to dissociate ventral and dorsal responses to 
stimuli – a dichotomy relevant for several phenomena at the intersection of 
affective and cognitive neurosciences (Dolcos, Iordan, & Dolcos, 2011). 
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6. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis employed more as well as less developed EEG-correlates of affec-
tive attention to enhance our understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying 
this as well as related phenomenon. More specifically, temporal and spectral 
distinctions within posterior EEG were associated with different processing 
stages and types of gain control, respectively. These developments were used to 
address several particular research problems as well as propose extended hypo-
theses based on a model of underlying brain mechanisms. 
The temporal dissociations were first of all used to investigate the auto-
maticity of affective attention. The two main datasets of this thesis constituted 
manipulations of the intentionality (Study I and III) and effortlessness (Study II) 
aspects of automaticity (Bargh, 1994) – while both experiments involved mani-
pulations of the motivation to attend to emotional meaning, the task in Study II 
also limited the available processing resources. Different findings supported 
considering affective attention more automatic on the first than on the second 
processing stage. In the present data this held for unintentionality as well as 
effortlessness, although the latter may also be dependent on the level of 
cognitive load (Pessoa, 2010; Schupp, Stockburger, Bublatzky, et al., 2007).  
More broadly, the present findings support construing affective attention as a 
two-stage process (Öhman et al., 2001; Schupp et al., 2006). Given that the 
brain mechanisms of cognitive and affective attention differ, this inference 
contributes to the growing body of evidence suggesting that the two-stage 
models intended for the former type of attention can indeed be extrapolated to 
the latter. More specifically, top-down attention may interact with bottom-up 
salience and affective significance maps in somewhat similar ways. For 
instance, in both cases direct signals from the faster maps may reach sensory 
cortices earlier than integrated biasing from the priority map. Meanwhile, 
during the second processing stage the salience and affective maps may become 
under increasingly effective top-down WM control. 
The spectral dissociations explored here suggest that theta and alpha 
correlates of affective attention can reveal distinct underlying dynamics. The 
stimulus and task effects on these frequencies differed in terms of direction as 
well as time-course. These observations imply differential involvement of 
excitatory and inhibitory gain control in affective attention processes. Neural 
enhancement of affective representations, presumably reflected in scalp theta 
power, may be the default means for biasing neural competition in favour of 
emotional stimuli. Meanwhile, depending on circumstances such as competing 
task demands, effective biasing may also require inhibition of affect-irrelevant 
brain processes, the extent of which may be visible in posterior alpha dynamics. 
These temporal and/or spectral dissociations were also demonstrated to 
contribute to research areas beyond affective attention. In Studies I and II, 
emotion regulation relying on attention-control was inferred to operate by 
limiting working memory resources available for affective attention, even with-
out interfering with the initial prioritisation of emotional stimuli. Meanwhile, 
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the EPN and the LPP were used to assess the attentional causes of emotional 
time distortions (Study IV) and the LPP employed to re-establish the affective 
images conundrum in anterior EEG asymmetry literature (Study V). 
Individual findings were also integrated into two sets of extended hypotheses 
aimed at inspiring future research. These originated from a simplified model of 
brain mechanisms (Figure 1; Baluch & Itti, 2011; Beck & Kastner, 2009; 
Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2013; Knudsen, 2007; Pourtois et al., 2013) 
specifying that emotional attention relies on sensory biasing (Lindquist et al., 
2012; Sabatinelli et al., 2011) originating directly from the amygdala (Freese & 
Amaral, 2006; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010) as well as from a frontoparietal 
priority map integrating bottom-up and top-down cognitive importance (Bisley 
& Goldberg, 2010; Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Gottlieb & Balan, 2010) with 
ventral affective significance (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Mohanty & Sussman, 2013). 
The downstream consequences of various types of bias signals were assumed to 
be observable in posterior EEG dynamics (Lopes da Silva, 2013). 
Some of extended hypotheses aimed to explain the emergence of two stages 
of affective attention from this basic structural model. An early stage was 
suggested to result from excitatory amygdala input preceding cortically 
generated bias signals at sensory brain regions (Luo et al., 2010; Pourtois et al., 
2010). In line with this prediction, early ERP dynamics were determined by 
affective stimulus features (Studies I and IV) irrespective of task-relevance 
(Study I). Meanwhile, the arrival of integrated priority signals was considered to 
mark the beginning of the second stage, explaining various combinations of 
affective and task effects found from 300 ms onwards (Studies I to III). During 
later sections of that stage, working memory was assumed to down-regulate the 
affective significance map (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012) and/or integrate it 
with the goal-relevance map (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Mohanty & Sussman, 2013). 
A second set of extended hypotheses ascribed partially independent origins 
for different EEG parameters. Based on early emotional effects, ERPs were the 
only measure related to dorsal as well as ventral bias signals. Theta was 
implicated in cortical priority signals by consistent task-relevance effects within 
the second processing stage. Possible subcortical origins of theta (Lewis, 2005) 
could not be determined however, as an affective effect during the first 
processing stage was absent in Study I and could have been caused by anti-
cipatory cortical processing in Study II. Meanwhile, alpha power was con-
sidered to be predominantly cortical due to the lack of inhibitory connections 
between amygdala and visual cortices (Freese & Amaral, 2006) as well as the 
late onset of emotional effects in Study III. 
In conclusion, this thesis calls for analysing posterior EEG dynamics as well 
as affective attention processes in terms of two processing stages as well as 
excitatory and inhibitory gain control. It also invites future research, preferably 
using concurrent analyses of different frequencies (e.g. Roux & Uhlhaas, 2014; 
Siegel, Donner, & Engel, 2012) as well as connectivity patterns (e.g. Popov, 
Steffen, Weisz, Miller, & Rockstroh, 2012) to test the proposed extended 
hypotheses regarding the origins of different posterior EEG modulations. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Elektroentsefalograafiline vaade emotsionaalse  
tähelepanu mehhanismidele 
Inimmõistus on varustatud mitmete teabe ülekülluse eest kaitsvate tähelepanu 
mehhanismidega. Ühed aitavad keskenduda olulisele ja teised märgata ootama-
tusi. Käesoleva doktoritöö fookuses on kolmandat tüüpi tähelepanu, mis tõstab 
esile emotsionaalset informatsiooni.  
Varasemast on teada, et erinevad visuaalse tähelepanu fenomenid toetuvad 
osaliselt jagatud ajumehhanismidele. Ilmselt realiseerub igasugune tähelepanu 
neuraalsete representatsioonide valikulises võimendumises. Selle võivad alga-
tada nii ajas ja ruumis ebatüüpilist avastav tahtmatu tähelepanu kui ka tahtlik 
süsteem, mis eelistab aktuaalsete eesmärkide jaoks olulist teavet. Mõlema 
süsteemi valikud integreeritakse ajus ilmselt ka ühtseks prioriteedikaardiks, mis 
võimendab nii ühes kui teises mõttes esiletõstmist väärivaid asukohti ja objekte. 
Emotsionaalse teabe eelistöötlus toetub osaliselt samadele mehhanismidele, 
kuid kaasab ka spetsiaalse emotsionaalse olulisuse kaardi, mida seostatakse ajus 
ennekõike amügdala talitlusega. Käesoleva doktoritöö peateemaks on geneeri-
liste ja spetsiifiliselt afektiivsete tähelepanumehhanismide koos- ja vastas-
mõjud. Nende uurimiseks kasutati elektroentsefalograafilist (EEG) signaali, mis 
on tundlik visuaalsete representatsioonide tähelepanulisele võimendumisele. 
Töö peamiseks uuenduseks on EEG rakendamine tähelepanu faaside ja võimen-
duse tüüpide eristamiseks emotsionaalses kontekstis.  
Kahe-faasiliste käsitluste kohaselt otsib varajane tähelepanu ebaküpsete 
mentaalsete representatsioonide seast teatud võtmetunnuste alusel potentsiaal-
selt olulisi stiimuleid. Valitud kuvandid pääsevad seejärel eelisjärjekorras teise, 
põhjalikuma töötluse faasi. Kaht etappi eristab töötlusmaht – kui esimeses 
võrreldakse suurt hulka tunnuseid paralleelselt, siis teises saab korraga ette võtta 
vaid üksikud stiimulid. Käesoleva doktoritöö esimene tulemustering toetab ka 
emotsionaalse tähelepanu käsitlemist kahe-faasilise protsessina. Ennekõike 
leidis kinnitust faaside mahupiirangust tulenev hüpotees, et emotsionaalne 
tähelepanu on varases töötlusfaasis automaatsem kui hilises. Uuringutes I ja II 
vaatlesid osalejad emotsionaalse sisuga fotosid suunates ühes katsetingimuses 
oma tahtliku tähelepanu piltidest tingitud tunnetele, teises aga mujale. Nende 
katsetingimuste võrdlemine lubas tuvastada automaatsust – kui afektiivne 
tähelepanu on tõepoolest tahtmatu, peaks see võimendama emotsionaalseid 
kujutisi neutraalsetest enam ka siis, kui inimesed ei pööra pildi afektiivsusele 
teadlikku tähelepanu. Tulemused näitasid, et nii see tõepoolest on, kuid enne-
kõike 150 ja 350 stiimulile järgneva millisekundi jooksul. Seejärel hakkab aju 
vastus sõltuma nii stiimuli emotsionaalsest sisust kui üha enam ka vaatleja 
huvist. Selline automaatsuse muutlikkus ajas on seletatav emotsionaalse tähele-
panu kahe faasi hüpoteesiga. 
Doktoritöö teine tulemusteklaster toetab ideed, et EEG kui lainelise signaali 
amplituudid teeta (4–7 Hz) ja alfa (8–13 Hz) sagedusribas peegeldava kaht 
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erinevat tähelepanulise võimenduse liiki – tähelepandu tugevdamist ja tähele-
panuvälise pidurdamist. Varasemast on teada, et erinevad EEG sagedusribad 
väljendavad erinevates funktsionaalsetes võrgustikes osalevate närvirakkude 
kommunikatsiooni rütmilisust. Tõenäoliselt suhtlevad tähelepanulise võimen-
duse allikad ja sihtmärgid samuti sünkroonsuse abil ning seejuures on alfa-sage-
duslik aktiivsus pigem seotud representatsioonide pidurdamisega ning teeta 
nende tugevdamisega. Uuringud II ja III toetasid seda mõttekäiku näidates, et 
piltstiimuli emotsionaalne intensiivsus peegeldub nii alfa kui teeta võimsuses. 
Seejuures olid mõõdetud modulatsioonid sageduseti erinevad, viidates pidur-
duse ja tugevduse eristatavatele rollidele emotsionaalses tähelepanus. Näiteks 
võrreldes Uuringut III varasemate sarnaste töödega, ilmnes, et samasugust 
emotsionaalse sisu tugevdust esilekutsuvad olukorrad võivad diametraalselt 
erineda pidurduse poolest. Võimalik et pidurdust rakendatakse tugevduse kõrval 
ennekõike siis, kui ajus on emotsionaalsete stiimulite tajumise ja mõtestamisega 
konkureerimas muid protsesse.   
Kolmandaks demonstreerib see doktoritöö emotsionaalse tähelepanu EEG 
korrelaatide laiemaid kasutusvõimalusi afektiivses neuroteaduses. Esmalt aita-
vad tulemused täpsustada tähelepanu kõrvalejuhtimise kui emotsioonide 
reguleerimise strateegia toimemehhanisme. Uuringud I ja II osutavad, et katsed 
näiteks valusa raviprotseduuri ebameeldivust vähendada millestki muust mõel-
des, on tõhusad ennekõike siis, kui tähelepanu suunatakse emotsionaalselt sünd-
muselt mitte lihtsalt eemale vaid märkimisväärselt keerukale mõttetegevusele. 
Näiteks uuringus II paluti katseisikutel vaimusilmas detailselt kujutleda oma 
kodutänavat. Selline kõrvaltegevus tõepoolest piiras emotsionaalsete stiimulite 
pääsu tähelepanu teise faasi, millest piisas kogetava seisundi intensiivsuse 
vähenemiseks. Uuringus I juhiti katseisikute tähelepanu kõrvale aga lihtsama 
ülesandega, mille tulemusel emotsionaalne tähelepanu küll vähenes, kuid suhte-
lised erinevused stiimulikategooriate vahel säilisid. 
Doktoritöö uuringud IV ja V pakkusid rakendusi Uuringus I demonstreeritud 
seostele EEG sündmuspotentsiaali komponentide ja emotsionaalse tähelepanu 
ning selle töötlusfaaside vahel. Uuring IV demonstreeris, kuidas afektiivse 
tähelepanu neurokorrelaadid lubavad jooksvalt analüüsida tähelepanu ressurs-
side jaotust afektiivse informatsiooni ning aja tajumise vahel. Selline strateegia 
võib osutuda väärtuslikuks emotsionaalsete ajamodulatsioonide alusmehhanis-
mide väljaselgitamisel. Uuringus V rakendati afektiivse tähelepanu korrelaate 
aga aju eesmise aktiivsuse asümmeetria teoreetilise käsitluse uuendusvajadusele 
osutamiseks. Kuigi ajupoolkerade esiosade erinevat aktivatsiooni on seostatud 
afektiiv-motivatsiooniliste lähenemis- ja eemaldumissüsteemide tööga, ei leia 
selle mudeli ennustused alati kinnitust, eriti kui süsteemide aktiviseerimiseks 
kasutatakse emotsionaalseid fotosid. Seni on kummastavas probleemis süüdis-
tatud peamiselt piltide nõrka ja inimeseti varieeruvat motivatsioonilist olulisust. 
Kui see oleks aga ammendav põhjus, peaks puuduvaid asümmeetria efekte saat-
ma ka puuduv emotsionaalne tähelepanu. Uuringu V tulemused seda versiooni 
aga ei toeta ning osutavad seega vajadusele parandada olemasolevat asüm-
meetria raamistikku.  
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Viimaks püstitati antud doktoritöös ka rida laiendatud hüpoteese tulevasteks 
uuringuteks. Esiteks pakuti emotsionaalse tähelepanu kahe faasiga seotud feno-
menide seletuseks välja, et spetsiifiliselt emotsionaalne tähelepanuline võimen-
dus mõjub sensoorsetele representatsioonidele varem kui tahtliku tähelepanu 
signaalid. Teiseks on tõenäoline, et alfa ja ka teeta võimsuses peegelduv dünaa-
mika pärineb ennekõike kognitiivsetest süsteemidest samal ajal kui sündmus-
potentsiaalid võivad peegeldada nii kognitiivseid kui afektiivseid sisendeid. 
Need, nagu ka paljud teised selle töö tulemused, vajavad ja väärivad edasist 
uurimist. 
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